No jurisdictional resilience provision for UK infrastructure operators

The pressure point for decentralised infrastructure is the operator rather than the protocol, and the Tornado Cash precedent showed states reach the tractable number of humans running nodes. UK operators of relays, homeservers, mixnodes, archive nodes and community services face the OSA duties regime, secret technical capability notices with gag provisions under the IPA, and data-protection exposure. They have no operator-specific legal guidance, no defence fund, no counsel network experienced in notice regimes, and no structural playbook covering jurisdictional distribution, entity structures or transparency canaries. The OSA compliance mutual entry covers community forums, and infrastructure operators below the application layer have nothing.

Every sovereignty-stack gap on this map assumes someone runs the infrastructure. If operating a relay from the UK is legally hazardous and unsupported, operators exit to other jurisdictions or quit, and UK communities inherit dependence on foreign infrastructure, the situation the stack exists to fix.

An operator resilience service: plain-English legal guidance per operator class, a retained counsel network and defence fund for notice recipients, structural templates covering entity, hosting and jurisdiction options, and published transparency norms, buildable by a digital-rights organisation with a specialist-firm partnership.

// Build now: First artefact: plain-English resilience guidance per operator class; specialist-firm partnership is hired counsel, not permission.

Every stack gap assumes someone runs infrastructure, operators face live OSA and secret-notice pressure with no defence fund or guidance, and the fix is buildable now.