No executive body coordinating cross-sector CNI resilience

CNI protection relies on piecemeal arrangements between operators, government, NPSA and NCSC; no executive body coordinates resilience across the UK's 13 CNI sectors or manages interdependencies (CETAS, NIC and the CCC all flag this). Outcome-based resilience standards promised by 2030 are not yet published in full. The CCC warns cascading failures (e.g. power to digital payments to transport) have no single coordinator. Note: energy-supply/grid resilience overlaps the stagnation domain's energy items - this gap concerns cross-sector coordination, not generation.

Modern crises cascade across interdependent systems, yet the UK secures each sector in isolation. Without an executive coordinator, a single trigger - cyber-attack, flood, space weather - can ripple across energy, water, digital and finance unchecked.

A freestanding national resilience/CNI agency with an executive (not merely advisory) mandate to set and enforce cross-sector resilience standards, map interdependencies, and coordinate all-hazards mitigation.

// State-led: Instrument: legislation creating an executive CNI agency with cross-sector standard-setting and enforcement powers.

Cascading cross-sector failures have no executive coordinator across thirteen CNI sectors, a high-stakes institutional gap, but building the agency is hard and outcome standards aren't due until 2030.